Economists have devoted substandal work to understanding the pricing behavior of expordng firms in die presence of variadons in die exchange rate. Much of diis research has focused on die concept of exchange rate pass-throughhow a firm alters die price of an exported good, denoted in the currency of the impordng country, to a change in the exchange rate. Curiously, diere has been litde research on die impact of dnde protecdon policies on exchange rate pass-dirou^ or, more fundamentally, on die pass-dirough of trade protecdon instruments. , 1989) . As survey in G(ddbeig and Knetter (1997), pass-tiirough is closely related to two otiier literatures: pridng-to-maiket (i.e., how an expoiting fiim price discriminates across destination countries given dianiges in exchange rates) and the law-of-one-price across intemational maricets.
(1989) evaluates die hypodiesis diat ad valomn tariff and exchange rate changes lead to symmetrically idendcal pass-dirough to prices, while Hanison (1992) and Knetter (1994) examine the potendal impact of quandtadve restricdons on exchange rate pass-through (or pricing-to-market).
In diis paper we explore for die first dme die impact of anddumping (AD) invesdgadons on pass-dirough of bodi AD dudes and exchange rates. Arguably die most heavily used trade restricdon in recent years, AD protecdon policies lead to AD dudes when a foreign firm is found to sell a good in a domesdc market at "less than fair value," i.e., dumping, and causing "material injury" to domesdc firms. An important difference reladve to standard tariffs is that AD dudes are potentially recalculated each year by die U.S. Dqxutment of Commerce (USDOC) based on the firm's previous-year pricing decisions in what are known as administradve reviews. The administradve review pn^ess implies that AD dudes are endogenously determined over dme by the firms' pricing decisions in both its export market and own home market. This endogeneity has important implicadons for both pass-through of the AD duty and exchange rate pass-dirough. In fact, we first show that opdmal behavior by the firm may imply pass-through of up to 200 percent of die inidal AD duty. Sec-(»id, we find that AD dudes and the resuldng administradve review process may substantially alter exchange rate pass-through elasdcides.
To test the effect of AD investigadons on pass-through of AD duties and exchange rates, we examine monthly panel data of 345 iron and steel imports fiom Canada to the United States over die period 1989 to 1995. Our panel includes products that were involved in U.S. AD iron and steel cases filed in 1992, as well as other closely related products that were not involved or received negadve determinadons. The period fiom 1989 to 1995 is judicious because it includes the complete dmeline of events dtiring dudes that duties from U.S. AD investigations, in combination with countervailing duties, are second only to the MuMfiber Arrangement quotas in terms of net welfare costs to the U.S. economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the administration of U.S. AD investigations. Section II develops our primary hypotheses about the impact of antidumping investigations on the pass-through of antidumping duties and the exchange rate. The rest of the paper tests these hypotheses using the case of the 1992 U.S. AD investigations of Canadian iron and steel products. Thus, Section III presents a brief history of these U.S. AD investigations. Section IV presents our empirical methodology, including discussion of the data, and Section V presents and evaluates our empirical results. The final section summarizes our conclusions.
L Overview of UJS. Antidiimiiiiig Investigiitkni Procedims
The U.S. antidumping laws are administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) and the U.S. Intemational Trade Commission (USrrC), each with distinct roles in the process. When a petition is filed, the USDOC's role is to calculate whether firms exporting to the United States are selling the product here at less than "normal" or "fair" value. For each case, the USDOC calculates an ad valorem dumping margin equal to the pereentage difference between the U.S. transaction prices they observe and fair value. The USITC concurrently determines whether the relevant U.S. domestic industry has been materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, due to the imports subject to its investigation.
Figure 1 presents a timeline of the standard U.S. AD investigation. The USDOC and USITC each make preliminary and final determinations during the case. If and when an affirmative preliminary determination is made by both the USDOC and the USITC, then the importer must post a cash deposit, a bond or other security equal to the preliminary margin determined by the USDOC for each entry of the subject product. This requirement stays in effect until either the USDOC or the USrrc makes a negative final determination. If an affirmative )!na/ determination is made by both the USITC and USDOC, then tiie USDOC issues an AD order to levy an AD duty equal to the estimated dumping margin on the subject product. The dumping margin calculation for both the preliminary and flnal USDOC determinations normally defines "fair value" as the investigated firm's own home market price for tiie same good.^ The USDOC typically compares sales transactions tiiat occurred in botii markets for the six montfas previous to tiie date the petition is filed (indicated by the dotted line before the petition date in Figure 1 ) to determine botii tiie preliminaiy and final dumping margins. Importantiy, the USDOC calculates the dumping margin based on the diffeience between the ex-factory foreign export and home price of the good-the theoretical price of tiie product as it leaves tiie production factoiy. Thus, in order to make tiiis calculation, tiie USDOC subtracts off transport, tariff, and other costs from the observed price in the United States to derive an ex-factory foreign export price. This will be crucial to understanding our discussion of the pass-through of the AD duty in Section II below. Additionally, in order to have comparable prices, tiie USDOC converts tiie U.S. price into the investigated finn's home-country cunency using (when available) the daily bilateral exchange rate of the subject country at the time of the U.S. transactions. This has implications for exchange rate pass-through, also discussed in Section II.-'' ' * This is the definition we use in the rest of the paper and the one that is applicable to the U.S. AD cases we examine empirically. However, in cases where home maricet sales are inadequate, dwn the USDOC bases fair value on sale prices in third-country markets. If third-country sales are inadequate, then fiur value is based on a constructed value for fair value using the investigated firm's manufacturing costs, selling, general and administrative costs, profits and packaging costs.
'However, when a daily exchange rate represenu a sizeable fluctuation, defined as a 2.23 pereent difEierence fnnn a rolling average of rates for the past 40 business days While the initial dumping maigin calculation is not straightforward, the ultimate AD duty faced by tiie investigated firm is even more complicated by ensuing procedures followed by the USDOC. In particular, once an AD duty is sq>plied to a product, tiie importer must pay U.S. Customs a cash deposit equal to tiie ad valorem AD duty times tiie value of tin subject product. However, these cash deposits do not necessarily represent the final amount of duties to be assessed on the subject imports. Rather, the maigin determined in tiie USDOC's final investigation is only used as a basis for estimating the duty liability of tiie importer. The actual liability of tiie inqxmer may be determined in subsequent years by tiie USDOC. Before 1984, tiiis was accomplished by automatic yearly administrative reviews by tiie USDOC. However, since 1984, such reviews have become voluntary. Eveiy year, on tiie anniversary of tiie date tiie final AD duties were assessed, the USDOC asks for any requests by interested parties for an administrative review of a finn's AD duty. A request may come firom the previously investigated firm which faces tiie duty or an interested U.S. fiim or organization. If a request is made, tiie USDOC recalculates the dumping margin using transactions from the 12 months immediately preceding the administrative review request, which is represented in Figure I by tiie dotted line between tiie final USITC detennination and tiie first administrative review. Once the USDOC calculates a dumping margin over this period, an AD duty equal to the newly calculated dumping margin replaces any previously existing AD duty. If a review determines that the margin during the review period is diffierent from the previous maigin used as a basis for the import-(referred to as the "benchmark rate"), the USDOC then uses the 'benchmark rate." In the 1992-1993 U.S. steel cases we examine, the USDOC used daily exchange rates with no udjusiment to a benchmark rate. 
n. Hypotheses
Unlike standard ad valorem tariffs, die magnitude of die firm's pass-dirough of an AD duty direcdy affects the level of die AD du^ in the future because of the administrative review process. A forward-looking firm will realize that dw effecdve AD duty it faces over die coming period endrely depends on its pricing decisions, which form the basis of the dumping calculadon in the administradve review, not the cunent AD duty at die beginning of die period. However, because of die way dw USE>OC defines and determines dumping, 100-percent pass-through of an AD duty does not imply that the firm will receive a lower future AD duty. The key to understanding this is that the USDOC computes the dumping margin as the difference between dw home and foreign export price before transport, tariff, AD duty, and odier costs are included in dw price of die product. That is, die USDOC calculates die dumping margin based on the difference between the ex-factory foreign export and home prices of the product, as described in dw previous secdon. This means that if the invesdgated firm does not alter its home price, one would have to see the foreign consunwr price rise by 200 pereent in order for die firm to eliminate the AD duty.
To show diis more clearly. Figure 2 depicts the components that make up the final consumer price in each market. The two columns in Panel A of Figure 2 depict die consumer prices in dw foreign (export) and home markets, p^ and /?"< respecdvely, before an anddumping invesdgadon. The foreign consumer price is comprised of die price of die product as it leaves die foreign factory ip^) plus die costs of bringing the product to tlw foreign consumer (XC), including transportadon costs, insurance, and standard tariffs. If the product is handled by an independent importer/distributor in the foreign country, dieir markup (or profit margin) would also be included in XC. Likewise, the home consunwr price is comprised of the price of the product as it leaves dw factor (p") plus addidonal local costs of providing the pixxluct to the home consumer (LC). The USDOC nets out XC and LC from the respective consumer prices, in order to calculate dw dumping margins as /?" -p^. Thus, in the example in Panel A, there is a dumping margin (DM) even if the final consumer prices are equal in the two markets.
Panel B and C of Figure 2 dien show two possible ways that a firm may pass through the AD duty. Panel B shows the case where die pass-through of the AD duty by the firm is 100 percent. However, because die USDOC will net out the AD duty in dumping calculations, the dumping margin reladve to Panel A has not changed and future administradve reviews will continue to find an identical dumping margin. Panel C shows the case in which the firm can eliminate the dumping nurgin for future administrative reviews by passing-through the AD duty 200 percent, while keeping the home price constant. In Panel C, the firm first raises p^ by the dumping margin to equal p", then includes the dumping margin in the final consumer price again to reflect the paid AD duty. Of course, the firm may employ some combination of raising p^ and lowering p" to help eliminate the duty, in which case pass-through to the foreign consumer price will be less than 200 percent, even if we observe eliniination of the duty.
The administrative review process connected with AD duties also has the potential to significantly alter exchange rate pass-through by firms facing these AD duties. The reason is that the USDOC compares the investigated firm's home price to its foreign price after translating the foreign price into the home currency. Thus, exchange rate movements are an important consideration for a finn that is choosing optimal prices in anticipation of an administrative review. In other words, the effective AD duty faced by the firm is a function not only of the prices in both the home and foreign markets, but also the exchange rate. In Blonigen and Haynes (1999) we present a formal pricing model that demonstrates that the existence of an AD duty (with the administrative review process that accompanies it) theoretically changes exchange rate pass-through of the firm, creating a possible structural bieak in exchange rate pass-through once an affirmative AD decision has been reached. The model finds that exchange rate pass-through with an AD duty may be higher or lower than exchange rate pass-through when the firm does not face an AD duty. The direction and magnitude of the shift in pass-through depends on die demand conditions in both markets (home and foreign), as well as the firm's cost function. In fact, it can be shown that exchange rate pass-through may be either higher or lower once a firm faces an AD duty even for the simple case of linear demands and constant marginal cost.
A related issue discussed in Blonigen and Haynes (1999) is the possibility of asymmetric exchange rate pass-through from AD investigations. In their model, a firm that alters prices to completely eliminate the AD duty finds itself at a comer solution, where the magnitude of exchange rate pass-through then depends on the direction of the exchange rate movement. Altematively, a more complicated dynamic model of asymmetric pass-through could be developed where firms attempt to mitigate the impact of an AD duty by increasing exchange rate passthrough (periiaps to unity) when the exchange rate is expected to appreciate in the future, and by decreasing (peih^s to zero) exchange rate pass-through when the exchange rate is expected to depreciate in the future. Thus, an additional hypothesis is that AD administrative reviews may lead to asymmetric exchange rate pass-through.
In summary, this section presents three implications of AD investigations and duties for pass-through of AD duties and exchange rate movements. First, pass-through of the AD duty to the foreign consumer price may be up to 2(X) percent. Second, there is structural change in the exchange rate pass-through elasticity once AD duties are imposed. Third, under special circumstances, there is asymmetric exchange rate pass-through after AD duties are imposed. As described in Secdon II, calculadon of anddumping dudes is an ongoing process through the administradve review procedures followed in U.S. AD cases. Widi respect to die steel cases, die majority of firms fixnn Korea, Canada, Australia, Finland, Sweden, Germany, and die Netherlands requested adminisdiadve reviews of dieir dumping margins on die first anniversary of the case in 1994. While die peddons were inidated by die foreign firms, the original domesdc peddoning steel finns also pardcipated heavily in these administradve reviews. Widi die excepdon of Broken Hill Propriety Co. fiom Australia, all reviewed firms received substantially lower margins, widi many reduced to almost zero. This suggests diat these firms changed their behavior to eliminate any dumping over the period reviewed.
The Canadian firms were in the group of firms diat asked for adminisdsdve reviews and, as shown in Table 1 , all reduced their AD duty to less than 2 percent by the first administradve review. This means die Canadian firms were aggressive in eliminating the AD duty and suggests they are an iqipropriate focus for our examinadon of altered pricing behavior fiom the AD invesdgadon and administradve review process. It is important to note that, although die first administradve review began in August 1994, die final determinadon of new AD duties from this first review was not announced undl March 1996.^ Thus, we assume in our analysis below diat Canadian firms faced die same market condidons and incendves from the end of die AD case in August 1993 dnough at least the end of 1995, die end of our data sample.
IV. Empiriaa Impknuntalion

A. Speciflcation and Tests
As detailed below, our bilateral sample is disaggregate U.S. iron and steel imported products fiom Canada. To explore our hypodieses with these data, we extend a standiird passdirough equadon (e.g., Feenstra, 1989 ) to include AD dudes and invesdgadons. Suppressing for simplicity the dme and cross-secdon subscripts, our inidal estimadon equadon for the U.S.-Canadian sample is equadon (1) (at the bodom of die following page), where expected signs of coefficients are summarized above the regressors; p"^ is die U.S. dollar price of U.S. iron and steel imports from Canada; e is the U.S. dollar price of die Canadian dollar; t^ is the initial anddumping duty; i^ is the ad valorem MFN tariff; w is an aggregate of home factor costs proxied bv Canadian producer costs in Canadian dollars; 9"^ is U.S. dollar price of die U.S. subsdtute good; /"^ is U.S. expenditureŝ The U.S. steel AD detenninations witii respect to Canadian firms were also being reviewed by a binational Canada-U.S. panel, as autiiorized by the U.S.-Canada Free Ttade Agreement, from SqKember 1993 tiirough 1996. Our reading of tiie various FedenU Regisur notices connected witii tiie case suggest tiiese binational panel reviews led to no significant changes in tiie U.S. steel case detenninations during our sample period. ''The method used to determine fair maricet value by USDOC. "HM" indicates diey used home market transactions, "HM/CV" indicates USDOC used home market transactions, hut also ruled out seme as "below cost" using a consbucted value meAod, and "all other" indicates that a dumping margin was not calcuUted for the specific firm at the time of the investigation, and thus, the "all other" margin (a trade-wei^ted margin of die firtns for which a dumping margin wa. <i calculated) was applied.
" Initial duty, calculated by USDOC, was 10.89, but ministerial errors led to correction and this lower duty as of March 1994. ** Duty that was amended subsequent to final detennination due to ministerial errors. In both cases the correction was verv small. on Steel in U.S. dollars; and 1^^^ is Canadian expenditures on steel in Canadian dollars.
Inclusion of the AD duty variable, ln(l + ), allows examination of the AD duty passthrough, which we predict may be as high as 200 percent (or a coefficient of 2 in our empirical model). One additional consideration is the application of "preliminary" AD duties for a few months before the case was finally determined and final AD duties were assessed. We separately include these "preliminary" AD duties in our framework, but expect pass-through may not be as high as pass-through with the final AD duties, due to the uncertainty surrounding the ultimate determination of the case while the preliminary AD duties were in place.
The coefficient on the exchange rate is our estimate of exchange rate pass-through. We predict that exchange rate pass-through is potentially altered in a significant manner once a firm receives AD duties because of the administrative review process that makes the AD duty endogenous with the firm's pricing decisions. Our sarrq>le of iron and steel products has variation across a number of dimensions that allows us to test for such a structural break. First, our sample includes products that were investigated and found afGnriadve, hence received a final AD duty, and those products that were identified nonaffirmative and did not receive a final AD duty. Second, our sanqile covers a significant time period prior to the imposition of the final duty, as well as a significant time period after its imposition. For the affirmative products, we expect to find a structural break in the exchange rate pass-through coefficient at the
In p"'' =/[ln e, ln(l + O-ln(l + r^. In w. In 9"^ In /"^ In time tiie final AD duty is imposed. For tiie nonaffirmative products, however, we expect tiiat the exchange rate pass-tiirough coefficient remains constant throughout our sample and equal to tiie exchange rate pass-tiirougih coefficient for tiie affirmative products prior to tiie structural break. We are also able to test for asymmetric exchange rate pass-tiirough responses for the affirmative proiducts by sepuating tiie exchange rate pass-tiirough effect into appreciation and depreciation movements for tiie period after the AD duties are imposed.
B. Data
To test our model we examine monthly data on U.S. imports of Canadian iron and steel products from 1989 through 1995. Examination of tiie Canadian case is appropriate for a number of reasons. Canada was one of the laigest import sources of iron and steel for the United States during this time period and was one of the source countries with laige volumes of trade involved in tiie U.S. AD steel investigations and subsequent AD duties. The evidence from the duty determinations in administrative reviews after the case suggest that the involved Canadian firms altered behavior substantially to reduce tiie AD duty (see Table 1 ). Furthermore, Canadian steel products were not subject to any U.S. VRAs before or during the time period of our data. Finally, we were able to gather more detailed data to control for Canadian producer costs than for other source countries."
We collected montiily data for all 10-digit Canadian imports of iron and steel products covered under HTS codes 7201 tiirougli 7219.T he U.S. AD investigation involved a substantial number of 10-digit HTS codes from HTS 7208 tiirough 7219. Importantiy, tiiese HTS codes cover U.S. AD iron and steel cases that received an affirmative decision and AD duty, and those that either received a negative decision and no duty or were not involved in tiie cases.
Identification of AD effects is also facilitated by having montiily time-series data for each • As Knetter (1993) and Goldberg and Knetter (1997) point out, it is important to control as pncisely as possible for cost shocks in empirical pass-through studies.
' A data appendix, available firom dw andiors upon request, details sources and construction of our variables. product beginning three years before the AD case was filed to almost two years after the final determination. As described in Section III, tiie U.S. AD steel investigations began in June 1992 and concluded in August 1993, The first administrative review occuired in August 1994 and examined transactions over the period of Februaiy 1993 tiirough July 1994. These events occur in tiie middle of our 1989-1995 timeseries data. We begin the sample in January 1989 when data by HTS {noduct codes first became available in the United States (rather tiian by tiie formerly used TSUSA system). We end our sample in December 1995 because there were significant changes in the U.S. iron and steel HTS product codes tiiat took effect in Januaiy of 19%, and we were not able to confidentiy concord these changes into the original HTS codes in our sample.
Our overall sample includes 345 10-digit HTS product codes. About two-thirds of the products do not have transactions for every month in our sample. However, over 70 peicent of our observations are by products with transactions in at least three-quarters of the months. In our analysis below, we also estimate our model using only the 98 product codes that have complete time series. This subset allows us to address potential statistical concerns related to time-series properties of our data in a more explicit fashion.'" Our dependent variable is the logarithm of the product's U.S. price inclusive of the AD duty and the tariff. Our U.S. price variable is constructed as monthly unit vdues for each of our products from official U.S. Customs data multiplied by one plus any applicable AD duty rate or ad valorem tariff rate. We note that an '" One concem is whedier dw missing values are primarily due to cessation of imports by the affirmative products after dw AD duties are imposed. While dw fraction of affirmative products with positive values in any given mondi after die AD duties are imposed are lower than before the case (S7.3 percent compared l» 6S.7), diis is not a precipitous decline. In addition, the fraction of products with positive trade values for nonaffirmative products is quite similar to diat for dw affirmative products across the sample: approximately 60 percent. Finally, when we tum to the 98 proiduct codes that have coniplete time series the fraction of product codes that are affirmative products (12 out of 98) is similar to diat for dw full sample (49 out of 345). ideal data set would have data by product and by firm because our product-only data encompasses acdvity by potentially numerous firms, each widi separate AD dudes. The USDOC calculates AD duty rates by product and by firm, but also reports a trade-weighted average of the firm-specific AD dudes by product which is called the "all othei" duty, because it is applied to any new fiim from dw souree country that enters and exports the subject product. We use this trade-weighted "all odier" AD duty to construct our dependent variable.'' One focus in this paper is dw pass-through of exchange rate changes on prices before and after the conclusion of AD invesdgadons. Figure 4 shows the movement of the U.S. dollar value of the Canadian dollar, end-of-month, for our sample period, and the beginning and end of the U.S. AD steel invesdgadons. From 1989 to dw beginning of 1992, the Canadian dollar was fairly • • While the use of die "aU odn" AD duty and pioductlevel data to ffstiiiMiff finn-lovel pass-dBmgli is a concern, uifixmatioii in Tldde 1 *"KB^*** Ihat the fimi, Sldco^ Inc., was primarily rcsponsihie for the nuyarior of U.S. impnis of affected Canadian iroo and steel pRNiiicts. To see dns, Table  1 shows that the trade-weigtated "U other duqr is veof close to dw firm-specific margin received by Steico, hic. Stable, widi a slight appreciadon. This was followed by a significant depieciadon of dw Canadian dollar in 1992 and 1993, widi a leveling ofF in 1994 and 1995. While dw genend betKta hi the exchange rate vary in the pre-invesiigadon, invesdgadon, and post-invesd^dion periods, each sutqwriod experiences both increases and decreases of the exchange rate.
Besides dw logaridim of dw exchange rate, other exjrianamy variables inchide the logaridims of dw AD duty, tariff, Canadian pn the U.S. domestic subsdtute price, and Canadian and U.S. expenditures on sted. We note diat, while dw exchange rate and Canadian and U.S. iron and sted expendiliBe variddes vaiy only by time, producer costs and U.S. dmwsdc subsdtute prices vaiy by time and pvoduct Table 2 diqiiaiys descripdve statistics for our dependent variable and right-hand-side variaUes for bodi the sanqiie of 345 products and dw sample of 98 products with complete time series.
V.
A. Initial Estimates
In this section, we [Hesent estimates of equadon (1) and severd variadons using wdgfated Table 3 summarizes pass-through estimates beginning with our full panel of 345 products from January 1989 to December 1995. Column (1) reports estimates of equation (1) for the full sample (17,437 observations). All coefficients that have predicted signs are highly significant with the theoretically correct sign (only the theoretical signs on the two expenditure coefficients are ambiguous), supporting our basic pass-through specification. The coefficient on the exchange rate is 0.349, indicating significant but incomplete pass-through, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that this coefficient is equal to the coefficient on the Canadian producer cost (0.251), supporting a common restriction imposed in this literature. The coefficient on the AD duty variable is significant at 0.818."
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 , respectively, report pass-through estimates of equation (1) for those products that received an affirmative decision and final AD duty (2,608 observations) and estimates for the nonaffirmative products, which did not receive a final AD duty (14,829 observations). Estimates in columns (2) and (3) are very similar qualitatively to those in column (1), with the only major diffierence being a reduced statistical significance on most of the variables in column (2) (likely a result of the much smaller sample size). Given the strong similarity in the exchange rate pass-through coefficients in all three columns, as well as the similarity in the three AD duty coefficients, one would conclude that imposition of an AD duty has no effect on pass-through equations. In fact, this conclusion is spurious, resulting firom imposing two invalid aggregation restrictions with the affiimative sample: a constant AD duty coefficient and a constant exchange rate coefficient before and after the period of final determination of the AD investigation.
'^ If one drops the AD duty variable and reestimates the column (1) specification (estimates are omitted for brevity), one obtains extremely similar estimates to those in column (I) that include the duty. One may infier from this that AD investigations and duties have no influence on exchange rate pass-through, but this inference is incorrect, as we demonstrate below. To test our pqier's hypotheses more specifically, columns (4) and (5) in Table 3 relax diese two restricdons for the affirmadve and nonaffirmadve products. In pardcular, the AD duty coefficient and the exchange rate coefficient are permitted to differ in the period before the final determinadon (January 1989 to August 1993) reladve to the period after the final determinadon (September 1993 to December 1995), noting that there was no duty, preliminary or final, prior to February 1993. For this specificadon, the coefficient on the AD duty in the period after the invesdgadon [in colunm (4)] is now approximately 1.626 (or 163 percent passthrough), which is substandally greater than 100 pereent pass-through, and substandally greater than the preliminary AD duty pass-through in the period during the invesdgadon. An F test rejects die null hypodiesis diat die coefficient on die AD duty after die invesdgadon is 2 at die 5-percent significance level (F stadsdc = 4.10), which is likely due to die fact that die firms did not completely eliminate the duty and/or they also lowered their home price to some extent to reduce the AD duty.
Turning to exchange rate pass-through effects, esdmates for the affirmadve products in column (4) show that exchange rate passthrough prior to the final determinadon is not statisdcally different from zero, but becomes significant at 0.860 after the final determinadon. Thus, column (4) supports a dramadc structural break with the affirmadve products on the exchange rate coefficient (F-test of structural change is significant at the 1-percent level), consistent with theoredcal predicdons. Impor- Table 4 .'^ The two unrestricted exchange rate coefficients are not statistically different from one another (1-percent level) and are numerically similar to the column (4) estimate of exchange rate pass-through prior to the final determination-^findings also consistent with theoretical predictions.
" The partial F statistic comparing the restricted column (2) estimates to tiw unrestricted column (4) estimates is 8.18, greater than the critical value F(2, <*>) of 3.00. This supports the structural break for tbe affirmative sample. The analogous F statistic for column (3) versus column (5) is 0.27, which is less than the critical value F( 1, ») of 3.84, and therefore does not support a structural break for the nonaffirmative sample.
B. Panel-Specific Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity
A potential limitation with estimates in Table  3 involves possible time-series problems such as autocorrelation, a limitation that cannot be addressed with the full sample of 345 products because of missing observations associated with zero trade. We address this limitation by estimating the five specifications in Table 3 with generalized least squares for those 98 iron and steel products that have complete time series, and present these results in Tables 4 and S. To constmct an appropriate benchmark. Table 4 repeats the Table 3 WLS, but for the sample of 98 products. These Table 4 WLS estimates support  the major findings of Table 3. Table 4 Table  3 , the aggregation bias in both these AD duty and exchange rate pass-through coefficients are revealed by the estimates in colunms (4) and (5). In the colunm (4) estimates for the affirmative products, the AD coefficient qiproximately doubles at the time of final detennination to iq)proximately 160 percent pass-through and the exchange rate coefficient increases from zero to significantly positive (0.769), while the column (5) estimate for the nonaffirmative products indicates no substantial change in the exchange rate coefficient.'' '* In Table 4 , dw partial F statistic for structural break for the affirmative products is 16.47. while the partial F Table 5 repeat the benchmark  estimates from Table 4 after GLS correction for panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The Table 5 GLS estimates support tiie  major findings of botii Tables 3 and 4 . The AD coefficients in columns (1), (2), and (3) are very similar to one another, as are the exchange rate coefficients. However, for tiie column (4) estimates for the affirmative products, the AD costatistic for structural break for the nonafBrmative products is 8.45. Bodi support a stnictural break, but we note dut for the nonaffirmative pioducts the wiMgnitiiH^ of the change in the exdiange rale coefficient is small and in the opposite direction to the corresponding change in the affirmative products. Similar "structural break" tests yidd qualitatively identical results for all other estimates presented subsequently in dw paper. Details are available from the authors upon request. efficient approximately doubles to 1.6 at die time of the find determinadon and dw exchange rate coefficient increases from zero to significantly posidve; while for dw column (5) esdmates for die nonaffirmadve products, diere is no substandd change in die exchange rate coefficient.
Estimates in
C. Dynamic Considerations
Tables 3,4, and 5 ignore potential dynamic effects in our model. In pardcular, one may expect that, given monthly data, lagged values of the exchange rate may have an impact on the firms' pricing decisions, perhaps proxying for exchange rate expectadons.'^ If true, omission of lagged exchange rates suggests that our pass-through estimates above are biased downward.
To examine this, we created a one-half year moving average series of the logarithm of the exchange rate (contemporaneous plus the previous six monthly observadons), and used this in place of the contemporaneous exchange rate specified above (estimates are omitted for brevity). These exchange rate pass-through elasticities increase substantially for the affirmative products relative to the static ones in Tables 3, 4 , and 5, as one would expect, while curiously there is little change in the magnitudes of these elasticities for the nonaffirmadve products. Importandy, the movingaverage estimates support a stadsdcal break in exchange rate pass-through for die affirmative products, but litde change for die nonaffirmadve products, as with esdmates specifying monthly exchange rate variables. In addition, there is little quditadve (and in many cases, quandtadve) change in the other coefficients. In pardcular. pass-through of AD dudes is dmost idendcd to the static specificadon. and most coefficients on other variables are almost identicd to previous esdmates.'^D .
Testing for Asymmetric Exchange Rate Pass-Through Effects
Since dumping margins were reduced to dmost zero during the first administradve review for the cases we examine (as shown in Table  1 ), it is possible that the involved firms rapidly set prices to exactly eliminate the dumping margin once the AD dudes were imposed. As derived in Blonigen and Haynes (1999), this comer soludon could lead to asymmetric exchange rate effects.'^ To test for asymmetric effects after AD dudes are imposed, we interact the exchange rate variable with dummy variables indicadng an appreciadon or depreciation of die exchange rate for dw period after die duties are imposed. Table 6 presents WLS esdmates that dlow asymmetric exchange rate effects after the AD dudes are imposed for affirmadve and nonaffirmadve proiducts for both our sample of 345 products [columns (1) and (2)] and the sample of 98 products [columns (3) through (6)], where the find two columns also use GLS methods to address pand specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasdcity. We show esdmates for the nonaffirmadve products as a comparison group, since our theory does not suggest asymmetric effects for these products.
Across these various samples and specifications, there is little evidence in Table 6 for asymmetric effects. F tests of equdity between the coefficients on an appreciating exchange rate versus a depreciadng exchange rate after the invesdgadon cannot be rejected even at the 10-percent significance level, with the exception of the GLS esdmates for the nonaffirmadve products in column (6). While we can reject equality of the two coefficients for the GLS nonaffirmadve sample at the 5-percent level, the magnitude of the difference is quite smdl.''^ Feenstra (1989) finds significant lagged effects in exchange rate pass-through, with the lagged response distributed over one year.
"^ These results are robust to other lag lengths in our moving-average exchange rate variable, and to specifications that include the contemporaneous exchange rate and lagged exchange rates as separate regressors and that replace the lagged exchange rates with a lagged dependent variable. Finally, as detailed in Blonigen and Haynes (1999), investigation of stationarity issues suggests our specification with data in levels is appropriate.
''' Evidence of asymmetry could also be consistent with a dynamic model of partial price adjustment and knowledge of future exchange rate movements.
" A possible reason we find little evidence of asyrunetry is because of the modest variation in the exchange rate in our sample. could arise in two additional forms, which we explore in this section. First, our nonaffirmative products include products that were not investigated as well as investigated products that received negative determinations. Both types of products ultimately face no AD duty, but firms might perceive the future likelihood of an AD investigation and affirmative decision for these two types of products differently and thus alter exchange rate pass-through accordingly. Our pooling of these two types of products may hide differences in exchange rate pass-duough. The firat two columns of Table 7 repeat for convenience our GLS esdmates for the affirmadve and nonaffirmadve 98 products with complete dme series, which were repnted in columns (4) and (5) in Table 5 . For comparison, columns (2a) and (2b) of Table  7 , respecdvely, disaggregate our nonaffirmadve esdmates fiom column (2) into investigatednegadve products and noninvesdgated products. The exchange rate pass-through elasdcides for the two categories of nonaffirmadve products are extremely similar and remain unaffected by the final AD determinadon, which does not support threat effects based on this test.
A second method to detect threat effects is by potential changes in exchange rate pass-through when the products firBt received preliminary AD dudes, rather than final dudes. In the Canadian iron and steel AD cases, preliminary dudes began in February of 1993, approximately six mondis before die final determinadon. Since die first administradve review by the USDOC included this period for their calculadons of the revised dumping margins, the firms may have changed their exchange rate pass-throu^ during this period before the final determinadon, pardcularly if they andcipated affirmadve decisions. As an empirical test, we break the exchange rate pass-through elasdcity esdmates into three periods rather than two: (1) before the preliminaiy determinadons in February of 1993; (2) during the period between the preliminary and final determinadons; and (3) after the final determinadon. Colunms (3) and (4) of Table  7 report GLS esdmates for affirmadve and nonaffirmative products for this new specificadon.
where the first row is exchange rate pass-through before the prelimineuy determination (as opposed to the final determination). Here again we find no evidence of threat effects. For both sets of products, we find no difference between the exchange rate pass-through elasticity in the "before" or "during" period, but statistically significant differences for the affirmative products between the "after" period and both the "before" and "during" periods.
In summary, the tests we present do not find evidence of threat effects. This does not necessarily mle out the possibility of underlying threat effects that we cannot identify. In particular, the steel industry has a history of AD and other trade actions that span time periods well before our detailed data sample begins, which may infiuence the parameter estimates for all our products in the sample.™
VI, CoDdiision
Antidumping protection has become one of the more important trade policies in the past 20 years, and the new wave of countries adopting antidumping laws suggests even greater activity in the future. This paper examines for the first time the effects of AD investigations on the pass-through of AD duties and exchange rates. We first show that the procedures used to calculate dumping margins and the ability of firms to receive revised AD duties in administrative reviews imply up to 2(X) percent pass-through of the AD duty to prices in the export market. We then argue that, because these administrative review and dumping margin calculations make future AD duties eridogenous with firms' pricing decisions, imposition of an AD duty maŷ A related concern that may affect our estimates more generally are sample selection issues. First, these products may have been investigated and received AD duties because of the associated finns' exchange rate pass-through behavior. However, our sample of nonafGrmative products includes noninvestigated ones tiiat were not part of the 1992-1993 caMs, nor any other previous AD cases. In our sample, these products do not exhibit different exchange rate passthrou^ behavior before tiie AD case from that of the affirmative products or investigated products that did not receive duties. A second source of sample selection bias may result fiom our focus on U.S. imported iron and steel products, rather dian behavior of affirmative products fiom all U.S. AD cases.
lead to stmctural breaks in exchange rate pass-through.
We test these hypotheses using a sample of monthly data on U.S.-imported Canadian iron and steel products, some of which were involved in a prominent 1992-1993 U.S. AD case. Our estimates find AD duty pass-through to the export-market price to be around 160 percent, much more than complete, consistent with our hypothesis. With respect to exchange rate pass-through, our empirical results support the prediction that exchange rate pass-through is substantially altered, as we find it increased dramatically after products received final AD duties. We find no similar structural break for nonaffirmative products, regardless of whether they were investigated and received a negative determination or were never investigated. Further analysis finds no evidence of asymmetric exchange rate pass-through after the case, nor evidence of threat effects over the time period of our sample.
Thus, consistent with previous literature, our results provide further evidence that the institutional stmcture surrounding AD investigations and dudes can have many important, and often subtle, implications that transcend the simple ad valorem AD duties we observe. While we show that AD duties and the institutions connected with them can lead to more than complete passthrough of the AD duty and a structural break in exchange rate pass-through in theory, the estimated 160 percent pass-through of the AD duty and increase in exchange rate pass-through result from the specific sample we examine. Thus, it would be useful to examine the effect of AD investigations on the pass-through of AD duties and exchange rates with firms from other countries and across other products. A promising sample for this extension might be Jqnn, since Japan is also one of the largest exporters of iron and steel to the United States and faced significant AD duties from the 1992-1993 cases, but unlike Canada, did not have the duties reviewed until a number of years after the final detennination.
